Apparency

Frequently Asked Questions

Installing Apparency

What versions of macOS does Apparency support?

Apparency supports:

† But see below for caveats about the meaning of “support” for Big Sur.

What's the story with support for macOS 11 (Big Sur)?

We've done our best to make Apparency functional on macOS 11 (Big Sur), but haven't attempted to adopt the “design language” changes.

That means Apparency doesn't use the new style of window title and toolbar. We are not, quite frankly, fans of this new design, and enabling it requires the new Xcode and SDK, which introduce re-testing requirements that we're not eager to undertake at this time (or for this reason).

Nor have we attempted to optimize for the new style of alert dialogs, which we also consider a mistake. Their aggressive centering is bad enough — readability and basic principles of graphic design be damned! — but apparently all alerts must now be the shape and size of an iPhone, even though your Mac's display is likely a bit larger than an iPhone and unlikely to be in portrait mode. Design is clearly no longer “how it works.”

That aside, we believe that Apparency is usable on Big Sur. Although, to be honest, our distaste for the direction of macOS has kept us from using Big Sur enough to be confident. If you find problems, do let us know.

Is Apparency a “Universal” app that supports Apple Silicon Macs?

No. We don't have one of Apple's “Developer Transition Kit” preview machines, and so are not able to test a version of Apparency built natively for Apple Silicon. Publishing an app that we can't test is simply not something we are willing to do!

We will have to see what happens with Apple's new hardware, and what options are available to us on our limited budget.

In the meantime, we presume the current version of Apparency will work under Rosetta, but of course, we can't test that either. If you're using Apparency on an Apple Silicon Mac and find problems, you're welcome to let us know, although we may or may not be able to fix it.

Even though it is not a universal app itself, Apparency can be used to examine other apps that might be universal. If applicable, it will show Apple Silicon as one of the supported processor architectures in the info pane, and also allow that architecture to be examined from the Executable Information sheet.

Does Apparency automatically check for updates?

Yes, once every 2 weeks — or less, if you use it less often — Apparency will download a small file from our website to get the current version number. If a newer version is available, you'll see an Update Available button on the right side of the app's title bar: available update indication

Click on Update Available to open the Apparency download page, where you can get the latest version.

If you want to change the frequency with which Apparency checks for updates, or turn off automatic checking entirely, use Apparency > Preferences > Update: update pref pane

Apparency never automatically downloads or installs the actual updated app. You make the decision about when or if to download it, and where and how to install it.

Understanding Apparency

Why should I care about these details of an app?

You shouldn't need to care about these details. And maybe you don't need to care about them — that is clearly Apple's position on the matter.

But if you do care about them, shouldn't it be easier to get the information?

Apparency is primarily for people who already know that they wanted something like this. If it doesn't sound like something you want, we won't try to convince you. After all, we make the same $0 whether you use it or not.

“But isn't [security feature X] just more Apple security theater?”

Maybe. Maybe not. But what is theater without an audience? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Seriously, we don't claim to be authorities in this. There is no shortage of other people who have opinions on the matter. Apparency simply provides visibility into the mechanisms that exist. You can decide for yourself how much trust to put in them.

“Won't [some command in Terminal] give me the same information?”

Yes, absolutely. There's nothing that Apparency shows that isn't available through some Terminal command or another.

For example, the information about the code signature, entitlements and such can be discovered using the codesign(1) command. But you have to wrangle codesign's arcane command line options, and run it multiple times different ways to get all of the relevant information. If you want Gatekeeper information, you also need to use the spctl(1) command. And if you want to actually examine the signing certificate, you need to grok codesign's --extract-certificates option, hunt down the (buried) Certificate Assistant app, click through its certificate evaluation flow, and drag the extracted certificates into it.

Apparency is simply aiming to make this all easier and more convenient.

Is Apparency “sandboxed”?

Yes, it is. In fact, you can easily see this using Apparency itself.

To quickly open Apparency using Apparency, use Cmd-Option-O. You can see that App Sandbox is enabled. You can also see that the app has an entitlement for reading user-selected files — this is required to be able to see the apps that you open, even if they are in a place that is not otherwise accessible to sandboxed apps (such as your home folder). It also has an entitlement for talking to the com.apple.security.syspolicy service — this is required for Apparency to successfully check an app for notarization.

Additionally, if you look under the MRSFoundation.framework component, you'll find a com.mothersruin.MRSFoundation.UpdateCheckingService.xpc service, which is also sandboxed and entitled. This is the component that performs the periodic check for updates, and must be entitled to initiate an outgoing network connection.

Why don't I get a Quick Look preview on macOS 10.15 (Catalina)? What if I prefer the standard preview instead?

Once you've opened Apparency for the first time, macOS ought to enable its Quick Look Preview extension, so that previewing an app from the Finder will show the enhanced version.

However, if you don't get the expected preview, open System Preferences and go to Extensions > Quick Look and make sure Apparency is checked.

If you'd rather not use the Apparency preview — but want to keep the Apparency app — you can disable the previews here as well.

Why isn't Quick Look supported on macOS 10.14 (Mojave)?

In macOS 10.15 (Catalina), Apple introduced a new scheme for apps that want to provide Quick Look previews, and has now “deprecated” the old scheme. These schemes are completely different, so supporting the pre-10.15 scheme would be a lot more work with no future. We are not enthusiastic about such work, even though we are sympathetic to people remaining on macOS 10.14 (Mojave) — especially since we are, too!

Why the name “Apparency” anyway?

It's a portmanteau of “app” and “transparency.”

Yeah, we know, but naming things is hard. At least we didn't give it a name that makes people think it's malware, like last time.

Using Apparency

What do the different Notarization statuses mean?

In the info pane, the Notarization status is described with one of the following:

Notarization StatusDescription
Granted The app or component was submitted to Apple's notarization service and approved for distribution.
None detected The app or component does not appear to be notarized. This might be caused by an inability to connect to Apple's servers. However, a network connection is required only the first time that macOS checks for notarization of a given app, and then only if the notarization is not “stapled” to the downloaded copy. So even in the absence of Internet connectivity, it is likely the app is not actually notarized.
Not applicable The app or component is signed by Apple directly, and therefore is not required nor expected to be notarized. This typically applies to apps installed with macOS, downloaded from the Apple web site, or installed from the Mac App Store.
Conflicting signatures The app or component supports multiple processor architectures, which have different notarization statuses. See more below.
Verifying signature Apparency is still verifying the signature on the app or component, and can't evaluate the notarization status until this is complete.
Multiple values Multiple apps or components are selected in the browser, and these have different notarization statuses. Select a single component to see its notarization status.

What do the different Gatekeeper statuses mean?

In the info pane, the Gatekeeper status is described with one of the following:

Gatekeeper StatusDescription
Apple System The app or component was signed by Apple, and is always allowed to run. This applies to apps pre-installed with macOS and to some software downloaded from the Apple website — including most developer tools.
Mac App Store The app or component was signed by Apple for distribution via the Mac App Store, and is always allowed to run.
Notarized Developer ID The app or component was signed with an Apple-issued Developer ID certificate, and subsequently approved for distribution by Apple's notarization service. The code will be allowed to run by default, unless disabled via System Preferences, under Security & Privacy > General > Allow apps downloaded from (where “identified developers” refers to Developer ID certificates), or via system policy changes made through the spctl(8) tool.
Developer ID The app or component was signed with an Apple-issued Developer ID certificate, but does not appear to be notarized. However, since the developer began distributing apps under this Developer ID prior to the release of macOS 10.14.5 (April 8, 2019), macOS will allow this code to run without notarization.
Can't evaluate Apparency can't evaluate the Gatekeeper status because the signature itself is not valid, as shown by the Signed By identity (and documented below). Since the identity of the signing certificate can't be relied upon, it doesn't make sense to evaluate that identity against any Gatekeeper policy.
Not evaluated Apparency isn't able to evaluate the app or component against the Gatekeeper policies. Currently, this should only be the case for kernel extensions, which have special requirements that go beyond those for normal apps. (In particular, the Apple-issued Developer ID certificate must be explicitly approved for signing of kernel extensions, so an additional level of Apple review is involved.)
Rejected The app or component was signed with a certificate that is not trusted by Gatekeeper (or perhaps not even by macOS; see below). This might be case the if the component was signed with a third-party certificate (which would be uncommon) or perhaps with an Apple-issued certificate that is not of the Developer ID variety (such as an App Store distribution certificate, which is only supposed to be used for submission to Apple, but is sometimes mistakenly used elsewhere).
Unnotarized Developer ID The app or component was signed with an Apple-issued Developer ID certificate, but does not appear to be notarized. Because the developer began distributing apps under this Developer ID after the release of macOS 10.14.5 (April 8, 2019), macOS will not allow this code to run without notarization.
Conflicting signatures The app or component supports multiple processor architectures, which have different Gatekeeper statuses. See more below.
Verifying signature Apparency is still verifying the signature on the app or component, and can't evaluate the Gatekeeper status until this is complete.
Multiple values Multiple apps or components are selected in the browser, and these have different Gatekeeper statuses. Select a single component to see its Gatekeeper status.

What do the different Signed By identities mean?

In the info pane, the Signed By identity will resemble one of the following:

Signed ByDescription
Software Signing The app or component was signed by Apple. This Apple certificate is used to sign the components of macOS itself (including those delivered through Software Update), as well as some software distributed through the Apple website, including most developer tools.
Apple Mac OS Application Signing The app or component was signed by Apple, prior to making it available on the Mac App Store. This applies to all apps from the store, whether made by Apple or by other developers. (All apps submitted to the Mac App Store are re-signed with this certificate before being made available for sale.)
Johnny Appleseed (123DE678IJ) The app or component was signed with the named certificate. The exact format varies with the type of certificate and the issuer. If it's an Apple-issued Developer ID certificate, there will usually be a parenthesized string of numbers and letters at the end, as in this example: this is the team identifier that Apple assigned to that developer's account. Click Show Code Signature to see details about the signing certificate.
No signature The app or component was not signed at all. This is often the case with older apps, or with developers who aren't particularly excited about paying Apple US$99 per year for the privilege of shipping software for macOS.
Ad-hoc signature The app or component was signed without using a certificate. This now-uncommon scheme allows certain code-signing features (such as entitlements) to be used with effectively unsigned code. But ad-hoc signatures don't tell you anything about the developer's identity.
Untrusted certificate The app or component was signed with a certificate that is not trusted by macOS. That is, the certificate was not issued by a certificate authority that macOS trusts. (For comparison, a Developer ID certificate is issued, ultimately, by the Apple Root Certificate Authority.) This is uncommon for modern apps, although in the olden days, self-signed certificates were used to establish that different versions of an app came from the same developer, and should have access to the same keychain items (even if the identity of that developer was otherwise unverified).
Can't verify signature The app or component appears to have been corrupted or tampered with since being signed. As such, the identity implied by the signing certificate is not reliable. This could be a result of the app being compromised at the point of download. Or it could simply be the result of errors occurring during signing, or in a software update process — the latter is depressingly common, even and especially for built-in macOS apps.
Skipped verification due to size The app or component is so large that Apparency suspects it would take an unusually long time to verify, and so did not try to do so automatically: see more on this below.
Conflicting signatures The app or component supports multiple processor architectures, which were signed with different certificates. See more below.
Failed to read signature A low-level error occurred in the macOS security subsystem while attempting to read the signature. If this occurs, it probably indicates corruption of the app that fundamentally damaged the signature, and is unlikely to be recoverable.
Removed to DYLD shared cache The component is part of macOS itself, and the signature was removed when the Mach-O binary was moved into the DYLD shared cache — a macOS 11 (Big Sur) optimization.
Verifying signature Apparency is still verifying the signature on the app or component, and can't report the signing identity until this is complete.
Multiple values Multiple apps or components are selected in the browser, and these have different signing identities. Select a single component to see its signing identity.

Why would Apparency tell me an app was “downloaded” when it clearly wasn't?

When you download a file in your web browser, macOS records how and where it was downloaded. If the file is an app, this tells macOS to activate Gatekeeper when the app is first opened. (If the file contains an app, as in the case of a disk image or zip file, the download information gets copied along with the app. So even after you've dragged the app to your Applications folder, macOS still knows that the app was downloaded.) Usually, the result of Gatekeeper is an alert, saying that the app was “downloaded from the Internet,” and asking you if you still want to open it.

In between when you download a file, and when you click OK in that Gatekeeper alert, macOS considers the file to be in quarantine (this terminology was more whimsical before 2020). Once you've allowed Gatekeeper to open the app, it is no longer considered quarantined, but there may still be enough information left behind for Apparency to detect when it was downloaded and by what app (i.e. your web browser). Apparency shows this information in the info pane; you can click on the download date once to see the downloading app name, and a second time to see the kind of download (e.g. from the Internet).

This is all probably what you'd expect “downloaded” to mean. But macOS also applies the quarantine mechanism elsewhere. Most significantly, when an app uses the App Sandbox, all files saved by that app are considered quarantined. For example, say that you receive an email with a zip file attached, and that zip file contains an app. When you ask the Apple Mail app to save that attachment, the zip file gets quarantined: as a result, opening the zip file and then the app inside will activate Gatekeeper. This happens because Apple Mail uses the App Sandbox, and not because of any special knowledge about the source of the files being saved. (Contrast this with Safari or Chrome, which explicitly tell macOS to quarantine a downloaded file, because it came from the Internet.)

Of course, for an app like Apple Mail, almost every file it saves was essentially downloaded from the Internet. Other sandboxed apps might not be downloading anything, but the files they save will still be quarantined — for example, simply save an image in the Preview app and it will be quarantined. This is because macOS does not rely on the (sandboxed) app to decide if content is potentially unsafe, but instead quarantines pretty much everything, and leaves it to Gatekeeper to decide what should be checked and how. (Obviously, Gatekeeper is going to check a quarantined app, but even some kinds of documents can be unsafe and will be subject to Gatekeeper checks.)

So, if an app that you open with Apparency was quarantined — even if it wasn't strictly “downloaded” in the traditional sense — you might still see a Downloaded date in the info pane. Apparency can detect that the quarantine came from a sandboxed app, but it doesn't know whether there was any actual download involved. If you click on the date, Apparency will show the app that saved it, and if you click again, from App Sandbox (save or open).

Sometimes, simply opening a file, without ever changing or saving it, will cause a quarantine to be added.

When you use the standard File > Open dialog from a sandboxed app, macOS gives the app permission to open and/or save that file, depending on the app's entitlements. But, when the Resume feature of macOS saves the open windows of the app, it saves the app's permissions in a way that does not preclude changing the file, and this triggers a quarantine on the file. [More precisely, in a document-based app, AppKit creates a security-scoped bookmark for each open document URL, and if the URL is user-writable, it omits the NSURLBookmarkCreationSecurityScopeAllowOnlyReadAccess option — even if the app has declared its read-only intent via both the com.apple.security.files.user-selected.read-only=YES entitlement and the CFBundleTypeRole=Viewer document type declaration. This creation of a read-write bookmark triggers a quarantine on the file, at least in the absence of the com.apple.security.files.user-selected.executable=YES entitlement.]

This surprising behavior applies to Apparency itself: if you open a standalone executable with Apparency, you might find that Apparency claims that it was downloaded by Apparency itself! This is simply because Apparency opened it, even though it never changes or saves anything. This can be baffling, but it only happens when you open a standalone executable (not an app or other bundle); we don't try to fudge or hide it, because you should be able to trust that Apparency is showing you the actual quarantine information.

What are “code signing options” and how can I view them?

The macOS code signing mechanism has a number of additional options that can be applied to a component. These flags change the way that macOS handles certain aspects of the code signature when the app is used.

For example, there's a Library Validation option that restricts the app to using only those dynamic libraries or frameworks provided by macOS, or those signed by the same developer. And there is a Kill option that tells macOS that it should terminate the app if the code signature should become invalid while open.

To our knowledge, the only Apple documentation of these options are in the codesign(1) man page (see the Option Flags section), and in the Security/CSCommon.h header (see the SecCodeSignatureFlags enumeration). The latter contains some options not mentioned in the former.

Apparency doesn't show these options by default, because they are not terribly common, and (quite frankly) because we don't understand the nuances of them ourselves, and can't really provide any guidance on interpreting them! However, if you want to see them in Apparency, you can enable them using Apparency > Preferences > General > Show code signature options for selected component. With this enabled, Apparency will show the options at the bottom of the info pane. (Note that Apparency won't show the Runtime or Adhoc options here, though, since these are already represented elsewhere in the info pane — the first under Hardening and the second under Signed By.)

What is a “code signing identity” and what is it used for?

A code signing identity allows macOS to recognize a specific app from an Apple-registered developer, without regard to a particular version of that app. This is used by macOS to grant access to sensitive resources — such as keychain items or App Sandbox “containers” — in a way that won't break every time the app is updated.

In its typical form, a code signing identity consists of two pieces:

  • a bundle identifier, which is not trustworthy on its own, since any app can claim to be, say, com.mothersruin.Apparency; and
  • an Apple-assigned developer identity, which can be claimed only by someone holding the private key of a matching Apple-issued Developer ID certificate.

Any app that matches both of these attributes is assumed to be the “same” app, and is allowed to access the same resources. The developer can update the app with abandon, as long as the code signing identity doesn't change.

Usually, this all happens behind the scenes and isn't very interesting, but there are a few places where you do need to work with the code signing identity, such when creating a Privacy Preferences Policy Control (PPPC) configuration profile. You can grab the code signing identity from Apparency by selecting the app and choosing Edit > Copy Code Signing Identity (Cmd-Ctrl-C). The code signing identity can them be pasted into the profile's CodeRequirement key, for example.

A code signing identity — also known as a designated requirement — is defined using Apple's Code Signing Requirement Language. These requirements can get arbitrarily complex, and an app might not use the typical form. But for the curious, here's an annotated version of a typical code signing identity (the one for Apparency itself):
anchor apple generic /* signing certificate was issued by Apple, trusted by Apple Root CA */
   and identifier "com.mothersruin.Apparency" /* and app has this bundle identifier */
   and ( certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.9] /* and signing certificate is the Mac App Store one */
         or ( certificate 1[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.2.6] /* ... OR was issued by the Developer ID intermediate CA */
              and certificate leaf[field.1.2.840.113635.100.6.1.13] /* ... for Developer ID Application use */
              and certificate leaf[subject.OU] = "936EB786NH" ) ) /* ... for the developer with this team ID */

The team ID is an identifier that Apple assigns to each registered developer; every Developer ID certificate that Apple issues to that developer will have the same team ID, and so will meet the latter part of this requirement. (You'll see the same team ID in parentheses in the Signed By identity in Apparency's info pane.) This scheme avoids problems when the Developer ID certificate gets renewed between app updates.

The alternative check for the Mac App Store certificate allows the same resources to be shared between a Mac App Store version of the app, and the same app distributed outside the store; this is part of the default code signing identity, and doesn't necessarily mean that both versions actually exist.

Why does Apparency sometimes say that it skipped verification of the signature?

In order to verify the signature of an app or component, every file that makes up that component has to be read in its entirety, creating a cryptographic digest (or hash) of the complete component. This digest is then compared against the one that was produced when the component was signed by the developer. Any changes that are made to any file of the component are thus detected, because it will result in a different digest and invalidate the signature. (This is a bit of an oversimplification, but conceptually accurate anyway.)

In most cases, creating the digest takes a few seconds at most, and the signature is verified quickly. However, for extremely large apps, verification can start to take real time. For example, Xcode — weighing in at over 10 GB in size — can take several minutes to verify. (Anyone who has ever installed Xcode has surely noticed the long delay upon first launch!) You might want Apparency to do the verification anyway, if the signature is the information that you're interested in inspecting, but otherwise, it is just an annoying use of your CPU.

Apparency tries to guess when an app or component is so large that the verification will take an unusually long time. Where it believes this to be the case, Apparency will not automatically verify that component. Instead, it shows the Signed By identity as Skipped verification due to size. When this occurs:

  1. If you don't care about the signature of the component, you can ignore this entirely.
  2. If you would like to proceed with verification of the signature for just this single component, select it, click the Signature toolbar button Signature toolbar button (or use Cmd-Shift-S), and then choose Verify Signature.
  3. If you would to proceed with verification of the signatures for all components in this app, choose File > Verify All Signatures.
  4. If you would like Apparency to always verify all signatures, even where it believes that this make take a long time, go to Apparency > Preferences > General and uncheck Skip automatic signature verification for large code.

What does “In DYLD Shared Cache” mean?

The DYLD shared cache is an optimization that has been in use since Mac OS X 10.6 (Snow Leopard).

Most every app that runs on your Mac uses the standard system libraries and frameworks (such as AppKit), and those standard libraries in turn use hundreds more Apple-private libraries. Finding, loading and preparing every one of those libraries and frameworks can delay app startup significantly, resulting in lots of “bouncing” time in the Dock.

Instead, the work of finding and preparing all of those libraries is done once, and stored as the DYLD shared cache. When an app starts, it only needs to load the shared cache (along with any non-system frameworks it uses, of course). Moreover, since every other process is also loading that cache, the actual loading work (an mmap(2) call) happens only for the first process; the loaded cache is then simply vended to every subsequent process. This not only speeds up app launch time, but also decreases overall system memory usage, because every process is sharing the same copy of the system libraries (via virtual memory) rather than loading another copy.

Through macOS 10.15 (Catalina), the DYLD shared cache was rebuilt whenever new system libraries or frameworks were installed. That is, when Software Update installed new versions of any of the libraries in the cache, it would run the update_dyld_shared_cache(1) tool afterward.

However, in macOS 11 (Big Sur), Apple introduced the signed system volume, wherein the macOS system volume (made read-only in Catalina) becomes an Apple-signed snapshot that can't be modified at all — except by Software Update, which is essentially now installing an updated snapshot of the system.

With this new model, the libraries and frameworks in the DYLD shared cache are fixed precisely by the version of the system snapshot. This allows the work of building the shared cache to be moved from the installer to the building of macOS itself. That is, Apple delivers the DYLD shared cache as part of the signed system snapshot, and there's no need for to run update_dyld_shared_cache on your Mac.

Which finally brings us back to what any of this has to do with Apparency! Because Apple is delivering the DYLD shared cache, they've decided that there is no longer any reason to deliver the actual libraries that went into that cache. From a user standpoint, they are indeed redundant. Unfortunately, from a development and debugging standpoint, this is quite painful, because it makes it much more difficult to analyze or otherwise reverse-engineer Apple's frameworks — which has become increasingly necessary as Apple's developer documentation has gotten progressively more useless.

Anyway, in Big Sur, if you examine a standard system framework, say AppKit.framework, you will find there is no actual Mach-O binary inside it (e.g. AppKit.framework/AppKit). Apparency can still open the framework, but the info pane will show the Executable as being simply In DYLD shared cache, instead of showing the usual processor architecture information. You can still use Component > Show Executable Information (Cmd-Shift-X), since Apparency retrieves the Mach-O binary information from the shared cache. This at least allows you to see the linked libraries and other parameters.

You will also notice that the code signature information is missing: Apparency shows the Signed By as Removed to DYLD shared cache. That's because the code signature normally lives inside the Mach-O binary (at least for frameworks and libraries), and that signature was removed in the process of building the DYLD shared cache. Essentially, the signature on the framework has been deleted — presumably, Apple is unconcerned about this because the entire system volume is cryptographically signed, so the identity of frameworks on that volume is not in question.

If you look at the framework in the Finder or Terminal, you might notice there is still a _CodeSignature/CodeResources file, but this is a useless artifact of the former code signature. This file contains digests of the resource files provided by the framework — which of course still remain — but nothing will actually use this file, because the code directory that would normally reference it (by digest) is no longer present in the Mach-O binary. Why Apple chose to leave it there, instead of deleting it along with the Mach-O binary, we can't guess.

What does “Conflicting signatures” mean? Why does Apparency show a processor architecture pop-up?

The macOS code signing mechanism stores most of the information about the signature inside the executable of the app or component. This information includes the entitlements and the code signing identity — along with a web of cryptographic digests (or hashes) that uniquely identifies the compiled code, the Info.plist and the other bundle resources (such as images or strings files).

If an app supports multiple processor architectures (e.g. Intel — 64-bit and Apple Silicon — 64-bit), there will actually be a separate code signature for each architecture. This is simply how the code signing mechanism is designed. (The app can even be “thinned” to remove architectures, without invalidating the signatures on the remaining architectures.) Typically, each of these distinct signatures is functionally identical: that is, signed by the same certificate, with the same entitlements, code signing identity, and so on. (They can't be exactly identical, however, because the compiled code is always going to differ.)

To ensure that a multiple-architecture component has functionally identical code signatures, Apparency will evaluate the signature for every architecture. If everything is indeed consistent, Apparency won't show anything special: the Signed By, Gatekeeper, Entitlements and other attributes will simply show the common values extracted from every architecture.

However, in the (unlikely!) event that Apparency does find a difference between signatures, it will instead show Conflicting signatures in the applicable field of the info pane. When you use Component > Show Code Signature or Component > Show Entitlements to get more details, you will be given a choice of architecture to examine. This allows you to see how the architectures differ. Obviously, the architecture that your Mac will use is the most interesting, but a difference in signatures is unusual enough that you may want to examine everything more closely.